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A country’s institutional environment significantly influences perceptions of auditing and reporting quality (ARQ) at the 
national level. Relying on a relatively unique measure of ARQ, collated by the World Economic Forum (WEF), we 
evaluate the influence of nine key isomorphic pressures on the ARQ in 26 Asia-Pacific countries. The results suggest that 
six of these (the efficacy of the corporate board, securities exchange regulations, reliance on professional management, 
protection of minority interests, adoption of international financial reporting and prevalence of foreign ownership) have a 
highly significant influence on the perception of ARQ whereas adoption of international standards on auditing is only 
moderately significant. However, contrary to expectations, our findings do not support the argument that the efficiency of 
legal frameworks and political systems significantly influence the perceptions of auditing and reporting quality in the Asia-
Pacific region. These results should be of use to investors and the accounting profession in evaluating economic 
environments. 
Summary at a glance 
This paper evaluates the influence of nine key isomorphic pressures on auditing and reporting quality (ARQ) in 26 Asia-
Pacific countries. Results suggest that six of these (the efficacy of the corporate board, securities exchange regulations, 
reliance on professional management, protection of minority interests, adoption of international financial reporting and 
prevalence of foreign ownership) have a highly significant influence on the perception of ARQ whereas adoption of 
international standards on auditing is only moderately significant. 
 
This paper investigates the determinants of auditing and reporting quality (ARQ) in 26 countries in the Asia-Pacific region. 
The extant literature treats differences in national accounting quality as a function of the legal/political system, strength of equity 
markets, tax system, corporate governance structures, ownership patterns and adoption of international standards, and this is 
empirically tested using mainly corporate-level data and other related proxies, principally from a preparer’s or analyst’s perspective 
(Barth et al. 1999, 2006; Leuz et al. 2003; Soderstrom and Sun 2007; Cheong et al. 2010; Kabir et al. 2010; Houque et al. 2012; 
Ahmed et al. 2013a, 2013b; Bajra and Cadez 2017). However, few studies to date have sought to provide evidence of how ARQ is 
perceived by users at the national level and whether some or all of the factors mentioned above can lead to cross-national variations 
in auditing and reporting quality.	
Our central thesis is that such variations in ARQ will be due to different levels of adoption and implementation of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and International Standards on Auditing (ISA), legal systems including laws 
related to investor protection, the extent of professional management, securities regulations and the corporate governance practices 
of a country (La Porta et al., 1997, 2000; La Porta 2006; Leuz et al. 2003; Schockaert and Houyoux 2007; WEF 2009; Nobes 2010; 
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Lont and Wong 2010; Boolaky 2012; Houque et al. 2012; Christensen et al. 2014; Boolaky and Cooper 2015). However, none of 
these studies explicitly considers the role of ISA and IFRS adoption and the type of political system on ARQ.	
We extend the literature by including these three previously mentioned variables as potential factors influencing ARQ. In 
doing so, we depart from previous studies such as Leuz et al. (2003), Leuz (2010), Houqe et al. (2012) and Ahmed et al. (2013a, 
2013b) in the following three ways. First, we use a country-level measure for ARQ from the perspective of a broad constituency of 
users. Second, our sample of countries includes 16 countries not considered in Leuz et al.’s (2003) study and other recent studies 
(e.g., Houqe et al. 2012; Ahmed et al. 2013a). Third, instead of using relatively broad clusters of countries on the basis of similar 
legal and institutional characteristics (e.g., Leuz et al. 2003; Leuz 2010), we consider the individual effects of a number of country 
variables on ARQ and also assess country fixed effects and year fixed effects. Finally, we categorise the selected countries into 
developed and developing countries to ascertain if the drivers of ARQ are the same and offer any reasons for this, if applicable.	
In this regard, we rely on a relatively unique cross-national data set collated on an annual basis by the World Economic 
Forum (WEF) as part of its initiative to publish regular Global Competitiveness Reports for each nation state. The use of the WEF 
in the accounting literature is fairly recent but emerging (see Houqe et al. 2012; Boolaky and Cooper 2015). Amongst the various 
themes collected from a survey of corporate leaders, the WEF seeks to evaluate their perceptions of ARQ in their home country. 
This score varies significantly between countries and arguably provides an alternative, albeit broader, dimension of ‘accounting 
quality’ compared to the accruals-related proxies used in the mainstream literature and the limitations of such measures thereof 
(e.g., refer to McNichols 2002; Dechow and Dichev 2002; Leuz et al. 2003; Chua and Taylor 2008; Hribar et al. 2010; Ahmed et al. 
2013a; Kabir and Laswad 2015). Whilst a measure of how users actually ‘rate’ the quality of accounting and reporting might be 
seen as subjective, such perceptions do influence users in their decision-making processes (e.g., equity investments, mergers and 
acquisitions and debt financing), specifically in terms of the extent to which their judgement would be swayed by available 
accounting information. We therefore contend that this measure provides an opportunity to examine ‘auditing and reporting quality’ 
primarily from a user’s perspective by relying on a metric which is not beholden to the assumptions underlying estimations of 
accruals-based measures and by the influence of management, governance and related firm-specific factors (e.g., as highlighted by 
Ahmed et al. 2013a; Hoang et al. 2017).	
To develop an explanatory model of the cross-national variations in ARQ, we are informed by the broad tenets of the neo-
institutional perspective (Di Maggio and Powell 1983; Scott 2001; Judge et al. 2010; Beckert 2010; Rahman et al. 2010). We 
contend that differences/similarities in the way ARQ is perceived are likely to be associated with the similarities/differences in the 
institutional arrangements prevailing in the different jurisdictions, whether at an organisational, state or societal level (Scott 2001). 
We posit that a high level of ARQ indicates that the respondents perceive accounting quality to be not only reflective of the 
technical features of specific accounting and reporting practices but also that it is appropriate to the context of the jurisdiction and 
therefore deemed trustworthy (Judge et al. 2010). This argument is consistent with the mainstream international accounting 
literature which suggests that there are a number of contextual factors, often labelled generically as ‘institutional’ (e.g., Nobes 1998; 
Soderstrom and Sun 2007; Leuz 2010; Houqe et al. 2012), which would impact on the quality of accounting information. Arguably, 
these institutional arrangements mediate the nature of the incentive arrangements and the agency relationships occurring at the firm 
level, as illustrated by the different analyses of key Asian nations (e.g., Ball et al. 2003; Rahman et al. 2010). As suggested by Ball 
et al. (2003: 258), ‘… [accounting] quality is what a country’s institutional environment demands’.	
We rely on the WEF dataset and country-level data over nine years (2007--2015) for 26 countries and run a multiple 
regression to investigate the determinants of ARQ. Our analysis suggests that the adoption of ISA is only a moderately significant 
factor. Political system(s) is positively but not significantly associated with ARQ in the Asia-Pacific region. The finding on the 
adoption of IFRS corroborates the expectations initially put forward, for example, by Ball et al. (2000), Soderstrom and Sun (2007), 
Cheong et al. (2010) and Baboukardos and Rimmel (2014). Likewise, the adoption of ISA is also associated with ARQ in line with 
prior studies such as Boolaky (2012) and Christensen et al. (2014). The authors suggest that investors are more reliant on the audit 
report if the latter provides information on key audit matters as required by the revised ISA on audit reporting. Our paper 
contributes to the literature and debate on ARQ in the following ways. First, there has been a sustained interest in the Asia-Pacific 
region as a high growth area and one where there is a variety of political and legal arrangements that may influence accounting 
quality (Ball et al. 2003). The region’s emerging markets powered the global economy out of recession in 2010. International 
capital flows substantially increased in 2010 followed by a rise in regional equity-market capitalisation by 19.2%. To that effect the 
IMF forecasted a slight growth to 5.5% in GDP for 2014 and 2015 (Regional Economic Outlook 2014: 5). According to the Comment [SH1]: Author:	not	listed	in	References	
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Regional Economic Outlook (2014) corporate leverage for the region rose because companies tried to take advantage of still 
favourable global liquidity conditions, whilst it is acknowledged that recent concerns have emerged as to the sustainability of 
corporate growth rates, particularly in the case of China. An understanding of the perceived auditing and reporting quality in this 
region would be of interest to a growing number of investors and stakeholders. Second, the overwhelming majority of prior 
accounting quality studies have focused on firm-level data and, as a result, have tended to emphasise agency relationships to 
explain cross-national differences in accounting quality. Yet, Rahman et al. (2010: 2) argue that agency theory is only applicable in 
an institutional setting (or settings) where the agency relationships between ownership, debt and management are clearly explicable, 
but there have been indications that this is not necessarily the case in many Asia-Pacific countries. Methodologically, this has 
implied the selection of a sample of (usually listed and non-financial) companies whose accounting choices and use of specific 
accounting standards are then linked to the mainstream indicators of accounting quality, that is, abnormal or discretionary accruals 
and timely loss recognition (e.g., Ball et al. 2003; Leuz et al. 2003; Rahman et al. 2010; Ahmed et al. 2013b). This has led to a 
rather one-dimensional picture of accounting quality in the literature. By adopting the WEF’s ‘perception of the strength of auditing 
and reporting’ as a measure of ARQ, it has been possible to assess accounting quality independently of firm-level accounting 
metrics and discretionary accounting behaviour, and conclude that the adoption of accounting and auditing standards (e.g., IFRS 
and ISA) contribute to higher/lower perceptions of auditing and reporting quality.	
Third, we depart from past studies in a number of ways by applying institutional theory to develop a conceptual model 
explaining the perceptions of ARQ at a macro level, using a unique set of country-level data that have not been extensively used in 
the literature so far (notable exceptions being Houque et al. 2012; Boolaky and Cooper 2015) and contrary to extant literature that 
relies on firm-level data and La Porta et al.’s (1998) dataset which have some shortcomings (see Kaufmann et al. 2007; Spamann 
2010). In particular, we examine whether the adoption/implementation of IFRS and ISA and political system(s) explain differences 
in national ARQ between countries located in the Asia-Pacific region.	
ARQ: Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
ARQ is the perceived extent to which auditing and accounting practices provide reliable information and ensure access to 
information in a timely manner (WEF 2010: 4). It is measured from a survey of a sample of top management leaders from 
companies in 133 countries to ascertain their opinions on the level of auditing and reporting quality in their country (WEF 2009: 
62). It is an actual, albeit subjective, assessment of the auditing and financial reporting standards to reflect company financial 
performance using a seven-point Likert-type scale. A weighted average of the scale reported by the respondents in a country is 
measured as the ARQ score. A review of the various Global Competitiveness Reports (GCR) of the WEF indicates that ARQ 
significantly varies across countries. There are a few studies on the variation in ARQ cross-nationally (Boolaky and O’Leary 2011; 
Boolaky 2012; Boolaky and Cooper 2015). The findings are that some determinants are similar, but their magnitude varies between 
Europe and Asia. However, these studies are based only on one year’s ARQ data (2009) and do not account for the recent changes 
in ARQ and in the adoption of international accounting and auditing standards in the Asia-Pacific region. 	
The neo-institutional perspective 
The neo-institutional perspective suggests that organisations and their actors are influenced by pressures from their 
institutional environments (Di Maggio and Powell 1983). Di Maggio and Powell (1983) describe these different pressures as forces 
and classify them into coercive, mimetic and normative pressures. They further argue that coercive pressure is more significant 
when corporations are subject to laws, regulations and actual regulatory enforcement. The perceptions towards the accounting 
quality in a country could therefore be associated with the power exerted by the legal system when dealing with cases involving 
accounting failures and investor protection (Rahman et al. 2010: 5; Leuz 2010; Houqe et al. 2012). Mimetic pressures occur when a 
corporation mimics the behaviour of other successful corporations or trading partners in a bid to improve its own legitimacy and 
acceptance. Finally, normative isomorphism occurs when individuals are trained under similar educational systems and tend to 
engage in similar conventional practices. Therefore, a corporation that draws from a standard pool of professional staff will be able 
to enhance their systems and practices because their ability to harmonise and enhance accounting quality may be greater. The three 
types of pressures are important to our understanding of ARQ and its determinants. Judge et al. (2010) adopt these concepts in a 
cross-national study that seeks to explain national IFRS adoption in 132 countries. They argue that the extent of IFRS adoption (as 
Comment [SH2]: Author:	not	listed	in	References	
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defined by Deloitte, 2007--2015) is the result of coercive, mimetic and normative pressures. Judge et al. (2010) target one variable 
for each type of institutional pressure, respectively foreign aid, import penetration and education level, and find all three variables 
to be significant in the presence of two control variables (market capitalisation and GDP growth). The authors also find that 
traditional cultural variables (Hofstede 1980) and security law factors (La Porta et al. 2006) are not significant in explaining the 
extent to which a country will adopt IFRS. Crucially, however, the measure of IFRS refers only to the ‘official’ level of 
implementation and not to the level at which it is actually implemented (or perceived to be implemented) in each country (Bradbury 
and Mear 2017). To some extent therefore, our study can be seen as an extension of Judge et al.’s (2010) study in that it is able to 
consider the consequences of IFRS adoption (or non-adoption) in terms of how accounting quality is actually perceived by users in 
their respective countries.	
IFRS and ARQ 
The aim of IASB-led regulation has been to harmonise accounting systems and practices and make accounting information 
more comparable and reliable. Accounting standards, legal and political systems affect accounting and reporting quality 
(Soderstrom and Sun 2007; Ding et al. 2007). When a country shifts from its own Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) to IFRS, this is likely to affect financial reporting practices, but the quality of accounting will continue to differ among 
countries because there are other determinants which influence reporting practices. Abongwa (2005) argues that despite the advent 
of international-level regulation (IFRS and ISA), convergence between the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has not been achieved because of differences in environmental and cultural 
factors. In particular, in a study of 46 countries relying on company-level data on discretionary accruals, Houqe et al. (2012) find 
that investor protection and IFRS adoption do not individually lead to improvements in accounting quality and it is in fact their 
interaction which does so. There are nonetheless strong pressures from the World Bank and other supra-national bodies for 
convergence and for countries to adopt IFRS and ISAs as a means to enhance the legitimacy of the country and of its companies as 
an attractive destination for foreign investors (Chua and Taylor 2008).	
Cheong et al. (2010) investigated whether IFRS adoption in Australia, New Zealand and Hong Kong has led to an 
improvement in forecast accuracy in firms that have used IFRS as opposed to the pre-IFRS periods. The authors argue that the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS entails greater transparency because IFRS requires firms to impart better quality information in the 
financial statements. Similarly, Baboukardos and Rimmel (2014) sought to provide evidence on fair value accounting and 
purchased goodwill in the Greek context. They contend that purchased goodwill reported in the accounts of Greek listed companies 
is value-relevant and infer that fair value accounting will produce relevant information even if the reporting environment is not 
conducive to IFRS application. They further argue that failure to comply with IFRS disclosure requirements impairs the accounting 
numbers reported in the financial statements.	
Lastly, Ahmed et al. (2013a) carried out a meta-analysis of studies analysing the effects of IFRS adoption, specifically on 
financial reporting quality (value relevance and discretionary accruals) and quality of information for analysts. On the basis of an 
analysis of about 50 studies from various countries (primarily European countries and a few from the Asia-Pacific region), the 
authors conclude that IFRS adoption has led to increases in the relevance of earnings but not of the book value of equity, albeit that 
results with regards to the latter vary in relation to the country’s legal system. In addition, the level of discretionary accruals has not 
declined whilst the analysts’ forecast accuracy has improved post-IFRS adoption. Collectively, these insights highlight the quality-
enhancement features of IFRS adoption but the improvements are not uniform and are often driven by legal and enforcement 
implications. Furthermore, the assessment of accounting quality is typically based on the preparers’ perspective, with the exception 
of studies relying on analyst forecasts. Our study instead considers the perceptions from a broader constituency of informed users 
and from the perspective of normative and mimetic pressures, we contend that perceptions of accounting quality would be linked to 
the extent of IFRS adoption, as suggested by several authors (e.g., Chua and Taylor 2008; Judge et al. 2010; Houqe et al. 2013; 
Ahmed et al. 2013a, 2013b). We therefore posit that:	
H1:	There	is	a	positive	significant	association	between	IFRS	and	perceptions	of	ARQ.	
ISA and ARQ 
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Compared to the significant body of work on IFRS adoption, there is very little evidence on the impact of ISA adoption on 
the quality of auditing and reporting. A few studies have only provided evidence as to the emergence of ISA globally (e.g., 
Humphrey and Loft 2013) and at the country level (e.g., Brody et al. 2005; Dellaportas et al. 2008; Mennicken 2008; Al-Awaqleh 
2010; Boolaky and Soobaroyen 2017). The latter have been mainly concerned with the challenges facing auditors and regulators in 
adopting ISA and do not emphasise the actual consequences for accounting quality. Simunic et al. (2014) contend that national 
auditing standards tend to reflect a country’s business environment and legal systems but recently, the authors assert that more 
countries have tended to adopt a more uniform set of standards, and in particular, it is predicted that ISAs will be adopted (with or 
without modifications) by countries with similar legal characteristics, with the aim of improving audit and reporting outcomes. 
Lastly, following the approval of a revised standard for a new reporting model by the IAASB1 in 2014, Christensen et al. (2014) 
conducted an experimental study to examine how nonprofessional investors react to a key audit matter (KAM) paragraph in the new 
audit reporting model. The experiment was performed on a number of business school graduates (nonprofessional investors) who 
invested in stocks and analysed company financial data. The authors suggest that an audit report with a KAM paragraph is more 
informative to investors and hence more likely to change their investment decisions as opposed to investors who use a standard 
audit report or investors who receive the KAM as part of the management’s footnotes. Since the revised standard became effective 
in 2016, the impact on professional investors can only be truly known by observing their investment decision after 2016. However, 
Christensen et al.’s (2014) study provides rare empirical evidence of the impact of the new audit reporting on users’ perceptions. 
Based on the above, our hypothesis is:	
H2:	There	is	a	positive	significant	relationship	between	ISA	adoption	and	perceptions	of	ARQ.	
Political system (level of democracy) and ARQ 
It	is	often	argued	that	accounting	standards	are	also	the	product	of	a	political	decision	(Belkaoui	1983;	Larson	and	Kenny	
1995;	Hassabelnaby	et	al.	2003;	Barbue	2004)	and	this	is	to	some	extent	the	case	for	auditing	standards.	Belkaoui	(1983)	contends	
that	civil	freedom	in	a	country	is	a	critical	success	factor	in	the	development	of	accounting	and	auditing	practice,	since	the	latter	is	
associated	with	an	increased	level	of	transparency	and	accountability	for	companies	and	other	organisations.	On	the	one	hand,	a	
country	with	a	low	level	of	political	freedom,	freedom	of	choice	in	all	forms	such	as	freedom	of	expression,	freedom	of	association	
and	independent	media,	signals	limited	access	to	information	(Houque	et	al.	2012)	with	a	concomitant	impact	on	the	availability	
and	quality	of	accounting	and	reporting.	On	the	other	hand,	countries	with	higher	levels	of	political	freedom	typically	rely	on	an	
informed	and	aware	citizenry	to	enable	the	exercise	of	voting	and	other	political	rights.	We	therefore	argue	that	the	more	
democratic	a	country	is,	the	greater	the	transparency,	and	hence	one	would	expect	higher	levels	of	perceived	ARQ.	In	contrast,	
Shleifer	and	Vishny	(1997)	suggest	that	free	media	have	been	a	setback	for	a	few	post-communist	countries	that	have	attempted	
to	introduce	open	market	economies.	Other	authors	contend	that	political	stability	impacts	on	the	economy	and	as	a	result	has	an	
influence	on	accounting	development,	including	auditing	(Larson	and	Kenny	1995).	Rahman	(1997)	emphasises	the	importance	of	
political	power	in	the	development	of	accounting	and	infers	that	those	with	power	would	be	able	to	influence	the	evolution	of	
accounting	standards	as	well	as	their	adoption.	Based	on	the	above,	we	therefore	hypothesise	that:	
H3:	There	is	a	positive	association	between	the	level	of	democracy	and	the	perceptions	of	ARQ.	
																																								 																				
1	The	revised standard was approved in September 2014 and planned for issue in 2015 with effect from 2016 calendar year-end 
audits. This new reporting model requires additional information to be included in the audit report, namely: (1) name of 
engagement partner; (2) statement of auditor’s independence; (3) key audit matters; (4) increased information on going concern; (5) 
auditor’s responsibility for ‘other’ information; and (6) placement of auditor’s opinion first within the report. A similar move was 
followed by the US PCAOB in August 2013 but contrary to IAASB, the former did not propose any change in the format and 
statement of independence. Key audit matters are referred to as critical audit matters. Likewise, the EU also recommended a new 
audit reporting model as part of its broad audit reform legislation in April 2014.  
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Research Methods 
Data 
This study used several sources to collect data, namely: 1) the Global Competitiveness Reports (GCR, 2007--2015) of the 
WEF; 2) the World Bank Report (2002–2015) on the Observance of Standards and Codes for the Asia-Pacific countries (ROSC); 3) 
the International Federation of Accountants Compliance Program Report (www.ifac.org); 4) the Economic Intelligence Unit’s 
(EIU) Democracy Index Report (2016); and 5) Deloitte’s Report on IAS implementation by country (2007--2015) (see Cornelius 
2005; Nobes and Parker 2008; Hegarty et al. 2009; Boolaky 2012).	
The WEF draws its findings from authoritative data sources (e.g., the World Bank, the United Nations) and an Executive 
Opinion Survey. Appendix A depicts the structure of the questions, including the content, criterion and construct validity of the 
response scale in the survey. The survey addresses 12 pillars of the Global Competitiveness Index. Each pillar contains a number of 
indicators (see Appendix B for a list of the 12 pillars of competitiveness). The indicators under each pillar are not mutually 
exclusive and one may influence the other (WEF 2009). Based on extant literature only six factors from Pillars 1, 6, 8 and 10 are 
considered as principal determinants of ARQ. We consider these six factors as control variables and add three additional variables 
of interest from the other sources to perform the statistical analysis. They are described below.	
Sampling, data reliability and validity 
The sampling is stratified based on the company’s size and sector of activity and ensures that it comprises a sufficient 
number of large firms and represents the main sectors of an economy. Appendix C shows the sample size by country over nine 
years from 2007--2015. Reliability and validity test(s) were performed at both the collection and processing stages and constantly 
reviewed;2 WEF surveys with completion rates of less than 50% were excluded; a multivariate outlier analysis was applied to the 
data using the Mahalanobis distance technique and followed by a univariate outlier test at country level for each question (GCR 
2009: 49--51; 61--63). With regards to validity, the questionnaire in the opinion survey was constructed using the main types of 
validity, namely: content, criterion and construct validity (Stangor 2006). Further evidence of the reliability and validity of the WEF 
dataset is its use for the conduct of empirical studies as well as bases for policy decisions and institutional reforms (GCR 2009: xi).	
The GCR of the WEF is used as a main data source for a number of reports3 prepared by national, regional and international 
organisations as well as in the economics literature, but its use has so far been very limited in accounting (see Francis et al. 2001; 
Black and Carnes 2006; Boolaky 2012; Boolaky and Cooper 2015; Houqe et al. 2012). For instance, Black and Carnes (2006) use 
the data to analyse the association between macroeconomic factors and accounting systems whereas Francis et al. (2001) rely on 
similar data to study the relationship between investor protection laws, accounting and auditing. Boolaky (2012) and Boolaky and 
Cooper (2015) use the same dataset for 2009 to investigate the determinants of the strength of auditing and reporting standards in 
Europe, and Houqe et al. (2012) rely on several WEF measures to investigate the determinants of the quality of accounting earnings 
(as measured by discretionary accruals).	
The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) classifies countries on the basis of ISA adoption using four groupings4 
whereas Deloitte (2007--2015) classifies countries on the basis of the ‘Use of IFRSs’, also using four groupings.5 Using data from 
																																								 																				
2 An internationally renowned survey consultancy in collaboration with the WEF and the Institute of Strategy and Competitiveness at the Harvard 
Business School were involved in the survey methodology and design. 
3 The Global Information Technology Report, The Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Report, The Global Enabling Trade Report, The Gender 
Gap Report and The Financial Development Report. The data are also used to elaborate the renowned Corruption Perception Index and the 
International Bribe Index. 
4 (1) ISAs required by law or regulation; (2) ISAs adopted by the national standard setter to be used in the country; (3) National Standards are 
ISAs, but any modifications(s) to meet local requirements are stated to be in line with the spirit of the International Auditing and Assurance 
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these two sources we re-classify the countries into four categories as follows: Category A for Group 1, Category B for Group 2, 
Category C for Group 3 and Category D for Group 4. The IFAC Report on Audit Quality (IFAC 2014) stipulates that the criteria for 
high-quality audit standards should be that they are: (1) established by an International Body; (2) legally enforceable; (3) capable of 
unambiguous translation and consistent interpretation. The reason for assigning Group 1 Category A is due to the fact that ISAs and 
IFRSs are mandatory. Therefore, it is expected that ARQ would be higher compared to countries where ISAs/IFRSs are not 
mandatory and where companies would be using national auditing and/or accounting standards. Table 1 reports the change in the 
status of IFRS and ISA adoption of the 26 countries in 2007, 2011 and 2015. These changes are discussed in the next section.	
Explanatory models 
In order to evaluate the extent to which these institutional-led factors influence ARQ at the country level, we rely on a 
regression analysis. We begin by pooling all the countries together to determine the impact of the variables of interest (Model 1). 
Then we exclude the US (Model 2) because it has adopted neither IFRS nor ISA. Because we are using panel data, it is important to 
decide between using the fixed effects or random effects model (Tauringana and Chithambo 2016). We have used both the fixed 
effects and random effects estimators to choose the most appropriate model. We performed the Hausman test, which did not accept 
the null hypothesis that unobservable heterogeneity is uncorrelated with the regressors. This implies a significant difference 
between random effects and fixed effects. This provides a statistical reason to argue that fixed effects is more efficient and effective 
for this study (Models 3 and 4). We also grouped the countries into developed and developing to provide more insights on the 
determinants of ARQ (Models 5 and 6). Our argument is that the level of significance of the variables may vary.	
The analytical method used to test the hypotheses involves the estimation of the following general form equations for a 
balanced panel data set of 26 countries over a nine-year period (234 observations):	
0 1 2 3 4       ARQ IFRS ISA POLYS Control Variablesβ β β β β ε= + + + + ∑ + 	(1)	
0 1 2 3 4      USARQ IFRS ISA POLYS Control Variablesβ β β β β ε− = + + + + ∑ + 	(2)	
0 1 2 3 4        ARQ IFRS ISA POLYS Control Variables COUNTRY FIXED EFFECTSβ β β β β= + + + + ∑ +
	(3)	
0 1 2 3 4         ARQ IFRS ISA POLYS Control Variables YEAR FIXED EFFECTSβ β β β β ε= + + + + ∑ + + 	
(4)	
0 1 2 3 4      developedARQ IFRS ISA POLYS Control Variablesβ β β β β ε= + + + + ∑ + 	(5)	
0 1 2 3 4      developingARQ IFRS ISA POLYS Control Variablesβ β β β β ε= + + + + ∑ + 	(6) 
Dependent variable 
ARQ	as	the	dependent	variable	is	the	perceived	quality	of	auditing	and	reporting	in	country	i	at	time	t	
measured	on	a	seven-point	Likert-type	scale	where	1	=	lowest	perceived	quality,	…,	7	=	highest	perceived	
quality.	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																							 																				
Standards Board (IAASB); and (4) Other (i.e., a country for which no data are available or that has declared convergence with ISAs but is far from 
achieving this objective). 
5 (1) IFRSs required for all; (2) IFRSs required for some; (3) IFRSs permitted; and (4) IFRSs not permitted. 
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ARQ-US	=	the	perceived	quality	of	auditing	and	reporting	excluding	the	US.	We	have	run	a	different	panel	
excluding	the	US	in	the	sample	because	it	has	adopted	neither	IFRS	nor	ISA.	The	reason	is	to	determine	the	
impact	on	our	results.	
ARQdeveloped	=	the	perceived	quality	of	auditing	and	reporting	of	developed	countries	only.	
ARQdeveloping	=	the	perceived	quality	of	auditing	and	reporting	of	developing	countries	only.	
We	have	also	grouped	the	countries	into	developed	and	developing	because	the	levels	of	IFRS	and	ISA	adoption, and the 
political systems are different. The reason for this is to determine whether the impact of the determinants is similar or not and if not 
why not.	
Independent variables 
The following independent variables are considered for this study:	
IFRS	=	score	of	IFRS	adoption	and	implementation	measured	in	country	i	at	time	t	measured	on	a	scale	of	1--4.	
1	=	IFRS	is	not	permitted,	2	=	IFRS	is	permitted,	3	=	IFRS	is	required	for	some	and	4	=	IFRS	is	required	for	all.	
ISA	=	score	of	ISA	adoption	in	country	i	at	time	t	measured	on	a	scale	of	1--4.	1	=	ISAa	not	adopted,	2	=	country	
claims	national	standards	are	ISAs,	3	=	standard	setters	recommend	ISAs	and	4	=	ISAs	are	mandatory	by	law.	
POLYS	=	political	system	measured	as	a	democracy	index	scaled	0--10	by	the	Economic	Intelligence	Unit.	
Year	dummy	=	dummy	variable	equal	to	one	if	the	country	is	in	the	year	i	and	zero	otherwise.	
Using	equation	(1)	we	run	a	pooled	regression	to	assess	the	impact	of	the	determinants	on	ARQ	using	all	26	countries	over	
a	period	of	nine	years.	We	subsequently	remove	the	US	data	and	re-run the regression using equation (2) to determine if the 
coefficients of the determinants of ARQ change for the remaining 25 countries. Since the basis of ISA adoption varies among 
countries, country dummy variables are included in the model to capture differences in ISA adoption in different countries. This is 
presented in equation (3). In order to provide additional controls for other omitted variables that could affect ISA adoption, we 
include year-specific dummy variables to control for systematic time period effects. This is presented in equation (4). We further 
divide the sample of countries into developed and developing (equations 5 and 6) using the World Economic Situation and 
Prospects Country Classification (2014) and investigate if the determinants of ARQ differ both in type and magnitude. At this level 
the year and country fixed effects are also tested. The dummies for year and country are not reported in the tables for terseness.	
Control variables 
Based on past studies we have identified the following control variables and they are explained below.	
Legal system(s) and ARQ 
The legal tradition of a country influences its auditing and reporting systems and practices (David and Brierly 1985; Salter 
and Doupnik 1992; Nobes 1983, 1998; Francis et al. 2003; Boolaky 2004; Nobes and Parker 2008). Nobes (1998) uses legal 
traditions to classify the accounting of countries (see also Salter and Doupnik 1992). La Porta et al. (1998) suggest that common 
law tradition provides more investor protection including minority investor protection and relate it to the extent of disclosure 
requirements (see also La Porta 2006). Many studies, such as La Porta et al. (2000) and Chen et al. (2010), use La Porta et al.’s 
(1997, 1998) indices to measure the impact of the legal system on the quality of reporting. However, Boolaky and Cooper (2015) 
use the WEF GCR dataset and suggest that judicial independence and efficiency of the legal framework impact on accounting 
quality. Controlling for these two legal variables we investigate how IFRS, ISA and political systems influence ARQ in the Asia-
Pacific region. We use the country scores for judicial independence and the efficiency of the legal framework as published by the 
WEF.	
Securities regulations and ARQ 
Comment [SH9]: not	listed	in	the	References	
Comment [SH10]: Typesetter:	these	are	third	level	headings	
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Securities exchange regulations (SER) seek to mandate firms to be transparent both during good and bad years and as a 
result mitigate information asymmetry and increase secondary markets’ liquidity (Hope 2003; Bushee and Leuz 2005; Houque et al. 
2012). They also mandate listed companies to produce a high standard of auditing and reporting and the penalties for non-
compliance can be significant both from an enforcement and market reaction perspective (Soderstrom and Sun 2007; also see Hail 
and Leuz 2006). As our next control variable, we use a general score relating to the perception of securities exchange regulations 
published by the WEF.	
Corporate governance quality and ARQ 
The quality of corporate governance influences the quality of auditing and reporting (Levitt 1998, 2000; Francis et al. 2003; 
Cohen et al. 2004; García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta 2009). For example, Levitt (1998) suggests that by enhancing corporate 
governance, the strength of auditing and reporting will improve. Francis et al. (2003) contend that the quality of corporate 
governance positively affects the quality of reporting. This argument is also supported by De Zoort et al. (2003). In our paper two 
elements are considered to be critical in determining the quality of corporate governance at firm level in a country. They are: 1) 
efficacy of the corporate board; and 2) reliance on professional management. Boolaky (2012) and more recently, Boolaky and 
Cooper (2015), investigated the impact of these two variables on the strength of auditing and reporting in the European region. Both 
studies find support for the relevance of the efficacy of the corporate board but not for the reliance on professional management in 
the case of Asia. We therefore include both as control variables. Efficacy of board and reliance on professional management are 
drawn from the scores published by the WEF.	
Prevalence of foreign ownership and ARQ 
A review of cross-national studies of corporate accounting quality (e.g., García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta 2009; Houqe et 
al. 2012; Ahmed et al. 2013a) shows that the extent of foreign ownership (e.g., whether at investment, associate or subsidiary 
levels) is not usually included as a variable of interest whilst it is plausible that foreign shareholding may influence the adoption of 
particular accounting policies. On the other hand, Boolaky and Cooper (2015) argue that the prevalence of foreign ownership in 
national as well as multinational units in a given country does influence the perceptions of accounting and reporting quality. In 
effect, the prevalence of foreign ownership indicates a greater integration with the global marketplace and may lead to mimetic 
behaviours to achieve greater legitimacy and access to resources (Judge et al. 2010: 164). We therefore conjecture the prevalence of 
foreign ownership as our last control variable in this study.	
Findings and Discussion 
Descriptive statistics 
We report the country classification by IFRS and ISA in 2007, 2011 and 2015 in Table 1. Columns 2--4 report on IFRS 
adoption whereas columns 5--7 refer to ISA. Five countries (Bangladesh, Cambodia, Chile, China and Russia) moved from 
category D (IFRS not permitted) to category A (IFRS required for all) in 2015. Six other countries moved from category C (IFRS 
permitted) to category A (IFRS required for all). Four countries (US, Vietnam, Singapore and Philippines) still remain in category 
D (IFRS not permitted). Madagascar, a French-speaking country that traditionally relies on the French Accounting Plan 2005, has 
moved from category C (IFRS permitted) to category B (IFRS required for some). Mauritius is among the few countries that has 
adopted IFRS and made it mandatory in its Companies Act in 2001. With regard to ISA adoption, 11 countries are in category C, 
that is, national standards are ISAs subject to modifications. For example, the Australian Standards on Auditing 230 has additional 
requirements to ISA 230. There are eight countries falling under category D. These countries declared convergence with ISAs but 
IFAC does not put forward any evidence in this regard. Mauritius is in category A, that is, ISA is required by law.	
Table 2 presents the country-level ARQ scores. For the sake of brevity, we only discuss a few of the scores. New Zealand 
and the US have the highest scores (6.3) followed by Singapore, Australia and Canada with 6.2 respectively. Among these five 
countries, Australia and New Zealand are in category A for IFRS and in categories C and B for ISA respectively. Singapore and the 
US do not use IFRS per se although in the latter case national auditing standards are ISAs subject to modification (as in Australia). 
Two countries score the minimum (3.8), namely Bangladesh and Vietnam. Bangladesh adopted IFRS in 2015 and the national 
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standard setter adopted ISAs in 2011. The mean ARQ score of Russia over this nine-year period is 3.833 with a maximum of four. 
This can be related to the late adoption of IFRS which was to be effective in 20126 and it is noted that ISA adoption is purely 
voluntary. India and Indonesia also have a high mean ARQ score (5.122 and 4.589 respectively). In 2007 neither country was using 
IFRS but did so in 2015. Indonesia required IFRS for entities whereas India7 only permitted the use of IFRS.	
We report the descriptive statistics for both the dependent and independent variables in Table 2.1. The mean ARQ is 4.820 
with a standard deviation of (0.8442). The Asia-Pacific’s perceived ARQ score is close to the average score of five published by the 
WEF. The mean value of IFRS adoption scaled by category is 2.448, which suggests that overall IFRSs are at least permitted in the 
majority of the countries within the region, except for a few countries such as the US, Singapore and Vietnam. The mean value of 
ISA adoption (1.72) indicates that in some of these countries ISAs are either adopted with modifications or there is little evidence to 
determine their actual level of convergence. The mean value of political system (6.150) indicates that only a few of these countries 
have full democracy in place. The other variables (efficacy of corporate board, reliance on professional management, efficiency of 
legal framework, securities exchange regulations, protection of minority interests, prevalence of foreign ownership) are all 
measured on a scale of 1--7 and the mean values are above 3.5. Appendix D reports the ARQ for the nine years between 2007 and 
2015 to supplement Table 2.1.	
Pearson correlations 
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlations for the dependent and independent variables used in the regression analysis and 
Table 3.1 the multi-collinearity test. We have considered a number of country variables which could affect ARQ but due to the 
multicollinearity problem we had to remove them from our analysis. Correlations greater than 0.9 between the independent 
variables can signal the presence of multicollinearity, which might influence the findings in the regression analysis (Field 2000; 
Hair et al. 2006). Table 3.1 confirms that there is no significant impact of multicollinearity on the model. Neither the tolerance 
factor nor the VIF values are a matter for concern. Overall the findings from Tables 3 and 3.1 provide support for the relationships 
put forward in our hypotheses.	
Regression results 
Table 4 reports the regression results in Models 1 and 2. Model 1 is a pooled regression including all 26 countries whereas 
Model 2 excludes the US. Both models suggest that two of the three independent variables are significant determinants of ARQ. 
The AR2 for Model 1 is 0.892, which indicates that the overall model fit is 89.2%. This implies that both the adoption of IFRS and 
ISA significantly influences ARQ. The adoption of IFRS is positively associated with ARQ (beta = .089, t = 3.432, p = .001) which 
therefore supports Hypothesis 1. This finding is consistent with the expectations put forward by Soderstrom and Sun (2007) and 
Ding et al. (2007) who suggest that IFRS regulation enhances the credibility of accounting information. Our results are also more 
categorical in nature compared to the evidence put forward by Houqe et al. (2012), who found IFRS adoption to be beneficial for 
accounting quality in countries with strong protection regimes, and by Ahmed et al. (2013a, 2013b), who respectively emphasise 
the minimal and partial benefits of IFRS adoption on value relevance and other accounting quality metrics. At the same time, our 
result does not support the comments by: (1) Schipper (2005) who contends that implementing a single standard in different 
companies and countries is problematic, thus reducing its positive impact on the perceived quality of accounting outputs; and (2) 
Abongwa (2005) who contends that the convergence between the FASB and the IASB has not been achieved because of 
																																								 																				
6 Russia’s Federal Law (No. 208-FZ) on ‘Consolidated Financial Statements’ of 27 July 2010 required that, from 2012 onwards, the so-called 
‘public interest entities’, including listed companies, prepare their accounts in accordance with IFRS as opposed to the national accounting 
standards. 
7	In March 2014, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) submitted to the Ministry of Corporate Affairs a proposed 
new IFRS roadmap and convergence plan for India. In the proposed roadmap, the ICAI recommended implementation of IND-AS 
by selected companies only in the preparation of their consolidated financial statements. 
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environmental and cultural differences and that the perceptions of accounting quality will not necessarily become more aligned 
cross-nationally merely because there appears to be greater convergence of accounting standards between countries.	
The adoption of ISA is also found to be positively but only moderately associated with ARQ (beta = .046, t = 1.693, p = 
.092), thus partly supporting Hypothesis 2. This indicates that the use of ISAs or its equivalent in the Asia-Pacific region has 
influenced perceptions of accounting quality. Between 2007 and 2011, the number of countries whose standard setters adopted 
ISAs increased from one to 10, whereas 12 other countries in 2015 mandated that their national auditing standards should be based 
on ISAs subject to modifications. So, whilst the diversity in the levels of ISA adoption is similar to the case of IFRS in the Asia-
Pacific region, mimetic pressures towards convergence of auditing standards are observed to be positively related to perceptions of 
national accounting quality. One possible explanation for this result is that the adoption of ISAs has a legitimating value and 
conveys assurances as to the basis upon which financial accounting information is prepared (under IFRS) and audited. Given the 
paucity of empirical research on the impact of ISAs (e.g., Christensen et al. 2014), this finding contributes to the literature by 
showing how ISAs influence ARQ in the presence of an IFRS adoption variable and brings some empirical support to the insights 
put forward by Simunic et al. (2014).	
As far as the political system is concerned, the model suggests that POLYS is positively but not significantly associated with 
ARQ (beta = .045, t = 1.443, p = .150). This implies that auditing and reporting quality is not materially influenced by the level of 
democracy in a country. A possible reason for this finding is that many of these countries are classified as flawed democracies or 
hybrid ones, and hence ARQ may not be as high as in the few fully democratic countries such as Australia, Canada, the US and 
New Zealand.	
When excluding the US from the pool of countries, Model 2 reports an AR2 of 0.90 or 90%. The impact of the three 
variables of interest does not significantly change. However, there are changes to the impact of two of the six control variables. 
Without the US, the impact of the efficacy of corporate board loses significance, moving away from a significant positive (beta = 
.098, t = 2.451, p = .015) to a non-significant positive relationship (beta = .034, t = .858, p = .392). The same effect is reported to 
the control variable prevalence of foreign ownership (POFO).	
Most of the variables are reported to be positively related to ARQ even when we control for year fixed effects and country 
fixed effects (see Table 5, Models 3 and 4). However, the prevalence of foreign ownership, although remaining positively related to 
ARQ, loses significance when we control for year fixed effects. In results not reported here, in the years 2008--2015, calendar-year 
fixed effects are not significant but positively related to ARQ. We also control for the effects of the global financial crisis but the 
result remains unchanged. When we control for country fixed effects the significance increases from .05 to .01 and that could also 
be explained as a result of the attractive investment climate offered by countries like Bangladesh, the Philippines, Vietnam and 
Peru. For example, in 2015, the Government of Vietnam abolished limits on foreign ownership in many listed companies.	
We further segmented the countries into developed and developing in order to determine if there are material changes in the 
determinants of ARQ between the two groups. We report the results in Table 6, Models 5 and 6. Our results report some changes. 
The efficacy of the legal framework is found to be a positively significant driver of ARQ in developed countries whereas in 
developing countries it is positive but not significant. The same applies to the efficacy of the corporate board. As discussed earlier, 
the board of directors appears less able to influence perceptions of ARQ in developing countries as opposed to developed countries. 
IFRS and ISA adoption remain positively related to ARQ in both groups, except for the case of ISA adoption, where the level of 
significance is higher (p < .05) in the sample of developed nations compared to the developing ones (p > .05 but < .10). This 
suggests that the impact of ISA on ARQ is less rigorous or at the very least only beginning to emerge in developing countries.	
Conclusion and Implications 
The WEF publishes a country-level ARQ score each year. The score conveys a metric of ARQ from a user’s perspective, 
rather than from an accountant’s perspective, and is of relevance to investors, standard setters, professional practitioners and other 
users. Using data from 26 countries from 2007 to 2015 in the Asia-Pacific, we find support for the neo-institutional perspective in 
underpinning the determinants of the differences and similarities cross-nationally.	
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We provide empirical evidence for the three institutional pressures (coercive, mimetic and normative) as measured by the 
efficacy of the board, securities exchange regulations, laws related to the protection of minority interests, prevalence of foreign 
ownership, IFRS and ISA adoption as well as the political system on ARQ perceptions at a country level. In support of the extant 
literature, IFRS is reported as having a significant impact on ARQ, which implies that in countries where IFRS is adopted and used, 
it will have a significant effect on perceived accounting quality relative to other non-IFRS accounting regimes, for example, local 
GAAP. Moreover, the efficiency of the legal framework, which plays a key role in the legal machinery of a country, does not 
significantly influence ARQ. One reason could be because in some of these countries the possibility of challenging a court dispute 
is perceived to be low. However, when developed nations are looked at separately, the efficiency of the legal framework is a 
positively significant determinant of ARQ. With regards to mimetic pressure(s), that is, the prevalence of foreign ownership, our 
finding supports the institutional prediction when considering the whole sample, that is, a higher level of foreign involvement is 
associated with higher perceptions of ARQ. Finally, whilst almost all countries around the globe appear to be converging, if not 
transitioning, towards IFRS and ISA and auditors and preparers of accounts are expected to comply with international standards, 
our findings suggest that perceived ARQ is more associated with IFRS than ISA adoption. Lastly, the political system was not 
found to be a significant determinant of ARQ.	
Our findings are wider in scope because we rely on actual country-level data to explain the determinants of accounting 
quality. The most recent studies using such data and ARQ are that of Boolaky and O’Leary (2011), Boolaky (2012) and Boolaky 
and Cooper (2015), but they do not explicitly rely on any theory as we have done in the present study, whilst drawing upon more 
recent data. Consequently, this paper contributes to the literature on cross-national studies of accounting quality (Leuz et al. 2003; 
Houque et al. 2012) by considering a different dimension and measurement of quality drawn from a user’s perspective, as opposed 
to one that is devised from a preparer’s perspective. Informed by concepts from the neo-institutional perspective, our results 
emphasise the significantly positive role of key institutional factors, IFRS and ISA to a somewhat lesser extent.	
In terms of limitations, it has to be acknowledged that the measurement and concept of accounting quality used in this study 
is based on questionnaire data that were not collected primarily for this research. Secondary data of this nature can at best only 
provide a snapshot of national attitudes towards accounting information and could be influenced by factors that are not necessarily 
or directly related to the preparation or use of accounting information in the various countries. Yet, the survey has been in operation 
for a number of years and has been based on a fairly rigorous method of data collection and weighing. Second, the institutional 
perspective has focused on a number of coercive-, mimetic- and normative-led variables but it is plausible that other variables have 
not been included in the model. Nonetheless, the limited data set has precluded the reliance on a large number of independent 
variables and the study has instead focused on the more salient ones that may matter within the Asia-Pacific region.	
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Table 1 Country classification by use of IFRS adoption of ISA 
Country 2007 2011 2015 2007 2011 2015 
Australia A A A C C C 
Bangladesh D D A A B C 
Brunei D D C D D D 
Cambodia C C A D D D 
Canada D A B B C C 
Chile D A A C C B 
China C A A C C B 
India D D C C B C 
Indonesia D D B D D D 
Japan D C C D B C 
Korea D A A C B C 
Madagascar C B B D D D 
Malaysia D D A C B C 
Mauritius A A A A A A 
Mongolia C A A D B B 
Nepal C A A D C C 
New Zealand A A A C B B 
Pakistan D D B C B C 
Peru A A A D D D 
Philippines D D D C B C 
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Russia D C A D D B 
Singapore A D D C B C 
Sri Lanka C C A D C D 
Thailand C A A C C C 
United States D C D D D D 
Vietnam D D D D D D Sources:	Deloitte	website	(www.iasplus.com)	and	IFAC	website	(https://www.ifac.org	accessed	several	times).8	IFRS	–	A:	IFRSs	required	for	all;	B:	IFRSs	required	for	some;	C:	IFRSs	permitted;	D:	IFRSs	not	permitted.	ISA	–	A:	ISAs	required	by	law;	B:	ISAs	adopted	by	national	standard	setter;	C:	National	standards	are	ISAS	subject	to	modification;	D:	Others,	i.e.,	no	data	available	for	these	countries	albeit	that	they	‘declared’	convergence	with	ISAs.	
 
Table 2 Country-level audit and reporting quality score (2007--2015) 
 
Countries Mean  Max. Min.  Std deviation 
Australia 5.911 6.200 5.800 0.283 
Bangladesh 3.667 3.800 3.300 0.166 
Brunei 4.933 5.100 4.800 0.112 
Cambodia 3.800 3.900 3.500 0.122 
Canada 6.100 6.200 6.000 0.071 
Chile 5.400 5.600 5.000 0.300 
China 4.644 4.800 4.400 0.167 
India 5.122 5.600 4.900 0.254 
Indonesia 4.589 5.000 4.300 0.190 
Japan 5.356 5.500 5.100 0.133 
Korea 4.500 5.300 4.300 0.361 
Madagascar 3.489 3.900 3.200 0.298 
Malaysia 5.433 5.600 5.200 0.122 
Mauritius 5.533 5.600 5.500 0.050 
Mongolia 3.678 3.900 3.400 0.192 
Nepal 3.844 4.000 3.600 0.133 
New Zealand 6.189 6.300 6.100 0.060 
Pakistan 4.356 4.800 4.200 0.194 
Peru 4.900 5.100 4.700 0.141 
Philippines 4.933 5.200 4.600 0.250 
Russia Federation 3.833 4.000 3.700 0.100 
Singapore 6.167 6.200 6.100 0.050 
Sri Lanka 5.044 5.300 4.300 0.292 
Thailand 5.011 5.100 4.900 0.093 
United States 5.267 6.300 5.000 0.265 
																																								 																				
8	www.cpaaustralia.com.au;www.icab.org.bd;	http://bdasc.org/faqs.php (Brunei); khcampus.wordpress.com(Cambodia) ICAC 
website; The Association of Accountants of Chile; 2006 for ISA , 2010 for clarified ISA  http://www.ifac.org/news-events/2010-
11/chinese-auditing-standards-board-and-international-auditing-and-assurance-standards; ICAI website (India) and others). These 
websites were accessed mainly on 6 February 2016 as from 10.12 am and re-accessed on 9 February as a counter-checking). The 
websites of the institute of accountants of all these countries were accessed. They not listed here for brevity. A copy of our detailed 
spreadsheet is available on demand.	
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Vietnam 3.633 3.800 3.400 0.173 ARQ	score	is	measured	on	a	Likert-type	scale	of	1--7.	
Table 2.1 Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean Max. Min. Std deviation 
ARQ 4.820 6.300 3.200 0.844 
Control variables 
EOCB 4.724 5.900 0.900 0.621 
ROPM 4.741 6.300 3.100 0.818 
EOLFW 4.0149 6.300 2.500 0.922 
SER 4.386 6.000 2.200 0.933 
PMIS 4.454 6.000 2.600 0.755 
POFO 4.931 4.000 3.000 2.425 
Variables of interest 
IFRS 2.448 4.000 1.000 1.345 
ISA 1.722 4.000 0.000 0.905 
POLYS 6.150 9.260 0.000 2.170 
Table 3 Pearson correlation analysis 
 ARQ EOCB ROPM EOLWF SER PMIS POFO IFRS ISA POLYS 
ARQ 1.000          
EOCB .784 1.000         
ROPM .880 .809         
EOLFW .721 .809 1.000 1.000       
SER .855 .664 .774 .748 1.000      
PMIS .908 .785 .849 .810 .837 1.000     
POFO .125 .175 .185 .697 .037 .146 1.000    
IFRS .069 .045 .016 .185 –.109 –.019 .073 1.000   
ISA .346 .129 .222 .273 .428 .273 .018 .110 1.000  
POLYS .563 .440 .569 .278 .541 .457 .111 .206 .410 1.000 
N = 234           
Table 3.1 Reporting collinearity statistics on pooled regression for Model 1 
Independent variable Tolerance VIF 
EOCB .294 3.403 
ROPM .144 6.930 
EOLFW .179 5.600 
SER .139 7.172 
PMIS .731 1.368 
POFO .916 1.092 
IFRS .503 1.989 
ISA .729 1.372 
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POLYS .675 1.482 ARQ	is	the	dependent	variable;	Tolerance	indicates	how	much	the	variability	of	the	specified	independent	is	not	explained	by	the	other	independent	variables	in	the	model.	If	this	value	is	greater	than	.10	it	indicates	that	there	is	no	multicollinearity.	Variance	inflation	factor	(VIF)	is	the	inverse	of	the	Tolerance	value.	Any	VIF	value	greater	than	nine	indicates	multicollinearity	(Field	2000;	Hair	et	al.	2006).	
Table 4 Regressions with and without US data 
Variables Model 1: Pooled 
regression with US 
Model 2: Regression without US 
Constant - - 
 1.073 1.255 
 .284 .211 
PMIS .429 .341 
 7.258 5.838 
 .001*** .000*** 
EOLWF .032 .036 
 .594 .601 
 .553 .567 
SER .260 .236 
 5.006 4.548 
 .000*** .001*** 
EOCB .098 .034 
 2.451 .858 
 .015** .392 
ROPM .173 .152 
 4.026 3.675 
 .000*** .000*** 
IFRS .089 .083 
 3.432 3.253 
 .001*** .001*** 
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ISA .046 .050 
 1.693 1.893 
 .092* .060* 
POFO .144 .017 
 2.130 .782 
 .043** .435 
POLYS .045 .031 
 1.443 1.005 
 .150 .316 
Adjusted R-Square .892 .900 
F-statistic 161.702 166.972 
p values 000 000 
N 234 225 
This table presents the results of the following regressions.	
Model 1: ARQ = β0 + β1 EOFLW+ β2 PMIS + β3 SER + β4 ECOB + β5 ROPM + β6 IFRS + β7 ISA + β8 POFO + β9 POLYS + ε	
Model 2: ARQ-US = β0 + β1 EOFLWUS+ β2 PMIS-US + β3 SERUS + β4 ECOB-US + β5 ROPMV-US + β6 IFRS-US + β7 ISA2-US + β8 POFO-US + β9 
POLYS-US + ε	
ARQ = Auditing and reporting quality; PMIS = Protection of minority interests; EOLFW = Efficiency of legal framework;	
SER = Securities Exchange regulations; ECOB = Efficacy of corporate board; ROPM = Reliance on professional management;	
IFRS = International Financial Reporting Standards; ISA = International Standards on Auditing; POFO = Prevalence of foreign ownership; 
POLYS = Political systems. We report the regression coefficients in the order of beta values, t values and p values. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.	
Table 5 Regressions on auditing and reporting quality 
Variables Model 1: Pooled 
regression (no fixed 
effects) 
Model 3: Country 
fixed effects 
Model 4: Year fixed effects 
Constant - - - 
 1.073 1.223 2.092 
 .284 .223 .038 
PMIS .429 .260 .423 
 7.258 4.035 7.828 
 .001*** .000*** .000*** 
24	
	
	 	 	
EOLWF .032 .045 .049 
 .594 .603 .610 
 .553 .771 .783 
SER .260 .355 .310 
 5.006 7.150 6.092 
 .000*** .000*** .000*** 
EOCB .098 .144 .105 
 2.451 2.282 2.824 
 .015*** .024** .005** 
ROPM .173 .102 .186 
 4.026 2.467 4.653 
 .000*** .015** .000*** 
IFRS .089 .079 .105 
 3.432 3.066 4.147 
 .001*** .002*** .000** 
ISA .046 .054 .046 
 1.693 2.150 1.730 
 .092* .033** .085* 
POFO .144 .612 .001 
 2.130 5.221 .057 
 .043** .001*** .954 
POLYS .045 .023 .034 
 1.443 .783 .891 
 .150 .434 .545 
Adjusted R-Square .892 .920 .893 
F-statistic 161.702 66.75 115.643 
p values 000 000 000 
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N 234 234 234 
This table presents the results of the following regressions.	
Model 3: ARQ = β0 + β1 EOFLW+ β2 PMIS + β3 SER + β4 ECOB + β5 ROPM + β6 IFRS + β7 ISA + β8 POFO + β9 POLYS + YEAR FIXED 
EFFECTS (3)	
Model 4: ARQ = β0 + β1 EOFLW+ β2 PMIS + β3 SER + β4 ECOB + β5 ROPM + β6 IFRS + β7 ISA + β8 POFO + β9 POLYS + COUNTRY FIXED 
EFFECTS (4)	
ARQ = Auditing and reporting quality; PMIS = Protection of minority interests; EOLFW = Efficiency of legal framework; SER = Securities 
Exchange regulations; ECOB = Efficacy of corporate board; ROPM = Reliance on professional management; IFRS = International Financial 
Reporting Standards; ISA = International Standards on Auditing; POFO = Prevalence of foreign ownership; POLYS = Political systems. We 
report the regression coefficients in the order of beta values, t values and p values. The panel regressions are estimated using: (i) pooled regression 
with no effects; (ii) country fixed effects; and (iii) year fixed effects. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively.	
Table 6 Regressions comparing developed and developing countries 
Variables Model 5: Developed 
countries 
Model 6: Developing countries 
Constant - - 
 2.584 .164 
 .013 .870 
PMIS .270 .460 
 3.858 6.214 
 .000*** .000*** 
EOLWF .132 .0756 
 1.594 .672 
 .035** .579 
SER .326 .246 
 3.867 3.441 
 .000*** .001*** 
EOCB .171 .057 
 .600 1.286 
 .049** .200 
ROPM .281 .232 
 5.033 3.738 
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 .000*** .000*** 
IFRS .285 .088 
 1.141 2.310 
 .001*** .022** 
ISA .153 .036 
 2.386 .901 
 .021** .069* 
POFO .381 .029 
 4.423 .867 
 .000*** .387 
POLYS .106 .050 
 1.466 1.217 
 .150 .225 
Adjusted R-Square .915 .811 
F-Statistic 64.335 77.878 
P values  000 000 
N 180 54 
This table presents the results of the following regressions. Model 5: ARQ developed = β0 + β1 EOFLW+ β2 PMIS + β3 SER + β4 ECOB + β5 ROPM 
+ β6 IFRS + β7 ISA + β8 POFO + β9 POLYS + YEAR FIXED EFFECTS (5)	
Model 6: ARQ developing = β0 + β1 EOFLW+ β2 PMIS + β3 SER + β4 ECOB + β5 ROPM + β6 IFRS + β7 ISA + β8 POFO + β9 POLYS + COUNTRY 
FIXED EFFECTS (6)	
ARQ = Auditing and reporting quality; PMIS = Protection of minority interests; EOLFW = Efficiency of legal framework; SER = Securities 
Exchange regulations; ECOB = Efficacy of corporate board; ROPM = Reliance on professional management; IFRS = International Financial 
Reporting Standards; ISA = International Standards on Auditing; POFO = Prevalence of foreign ownership; POLYS = Political systems. We 
report the regression coefficients in the order of beta values, t values and p values. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels respectively.	
Appendix	A	Typical	Survey	Question	on	ARQ	
In your country, how would you assess financial auditing and reporting standards regarding company financial 
performance? 
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Extremely weak < 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 > Extremely strong 
Circling 1 --- you agree completely with the answer on the left-hand side 
Circling 2 --- you largely agree with the answer on left-hand side 
Circling 3 --- you somewhat agree with the answer on the left-hand side 
Circling 4 --- your opinion is indifferent between the two answers 
Circling 5 --- you somewhat agree with the answer on right-hand side 
Circling 6 --- you largely agree with the answer on the right-hand side 
Circling 7 --- you agree completely with the answer on the right-hand side 
Source: WEF Global Competitiveness Report 2009: 50.	
Appendix	B	Twelve	Pillars	of	the	Global	Competitiveness	Index	
Pillars Description Number of indicators 
1 Institution 19 
2 Infrastructure 8 
3 Macroeconomic stability 5 
4 Health and primary education 11 
5 Higher education and training 8 
6 Goods market efficiency 15 
7 Labour market efficiency 9 
8 Financial market sophistication  
9 Technological innovation 8 
10 Market size 2 
11 Business sophistication 9 
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12 Innovation 7 
Source: WEF Global Competitiveness Report 2009.	
Appendix	C	Sample	Distribution	of	WEF	Survey	Respondents	
Countries 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Australia 82 83 67 45 72 68 57 57 66 
Bangladesh 87 93 89 89 69 86 71 71 76 
Brunei 33 38 44 111 91 44 34 34 71 
Cambodia 75 79 93 79 100 77 93 93 79 
Canada 76 79 100 90 98 103 133 133 79 
Chile 102 104 77 84 75 78 130 130 143 
China 313 323 373 362 370 362 364 364 364 
India 139 141 120 103 248 122 85 85 211 
Indonesia 82 83 90 86 86 88 87 87 90 
Japan 142 148 150 134 105 111 115 115 64 
Korea 108 116 95 176 112 112 81 81 81 
Madagascar 98 100 101 83 86 92 157 157 99 
Malaysia 67 70 68 110 87 79 106 106 96 
Mauritius 43 44 58 73 95 91 77 77 56 
Mongolia 73 81 83 81 84 85 86 86 81 
Nepal 94 99 101 98 102 93 93 93 84 
New Zealand 42 43 47 43 51 55 37 37 41 
Pakistan 125 130 300 218 130 110 130 130 56 
Peru 81 84 89 86 88 83 79 79 85 
Philippines 53 59 39 82 93 132 95 95 120 
Russia 341 343 368 346 377 414 294 294 216 
Singapore 131 136 144 122 152 178 150 150 163 
Sri Lanka 91 97 100 98 105 105 100 100 97 
Thailand 82 83 86 59 55 75 86 86 101 
United States 196 200 404 437 422 397 598 598 369 
Vietnam 128 130 144 104 96 96 109 109 95 
Total 2884 2986 3430 3339 3449 3336 3447 3447 3083 
Source: WEF Global Competitiveness Reports (2007--2015). The figures in the appendix are basically the	
sample size surveyed with a completion rate of more than 50%.	
Appendix	D	ARQ	Scores		
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Australia 6.2 6.0 5.8 5.9 5.8 5.9 6.0 5.8 5.8 
Bangladesh 3.3 3.6 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.6 
Brunei 4.9 5.1 5.0 4.8 5.0 4.8 4.8 5.0 5.0 
Cambodia 3.5 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.9 3.9 3.9 
Canada 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.2 6.1 6.2 6.1 6.0 6.0 
Chile 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.0 5.0 5.0 
China 4.4 4.7 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.5 4.5 4.5 
India 5.6 5.5 5.1 5.0 5.1 5.0 5.0 4.9 4.9 
Indonesia 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.3 4.6 5.0 4.4 4.6 4.6 
Japan 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.1 5.5 5.5 
Korea 5.3 4.9 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.5 4.3 4.3 
Madagascar 3.8 3.5 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.9 3.9 
Malaysia 5.5 5.2 5.4 5.6 5.4 5.6 5.4 5.4 5.4 
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Mauritius 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.5 5.5 
Mongolia 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.8 3.9 3.6 3.4 3.4 
Nepal 3.6 3.7 4.0 3.9 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.8 
New Zealand 6.2 6.3 6.2 6.1 6.2 6.1 6.2 6.2 6.2 
Pakistan 4.8 4.4 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.4 4.4 4.4 
Peru 4.7 4.8 4.8 5.1 4.8 5.1 5.0 4.9 4.9 
Philippines 5.2 4.9 4.6 4.8 4.6 4.8 5.1 5.2 5.2 
Russia Federation 3.8 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 4.0 4.0 
Singapore 6.1 6.1 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.1 6.2 6.2 
Sri Lanka 5.3 4.3 5.2 5.1 5.2 5.1 5.0 5.1 5.1 
Thailand 5.0 5.0 5.1 4.9 5.1 4.9 4.9 5.1 5.1 
United States 5.9 5.3 5.0 5.2 5.0 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.3 
Vietnam 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.6 3.8 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.4 
Average Score 4.91 4.83 4.82 4.81 4.82 4.83 4.77 4.80 4.80 
Source: Global Competitiveness Reports (2007--2015)	
	
	
	
	
